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This commentary responds to Lukas Milenski’s article, “The Grand Strategic
Thought of Colin S. Gray,” published in the Winter 2021–22 issue of Parameters
(vol. 51, no. 4).
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F

ew strategic thinkers were as prolific as the late Colin S. Gray. His pen
touched the entire gamut of strategic thought—from nuclear strategy to
strategic culture to sea power to geopolitics. Future scholars, perhaps this
author, will need to consolidate Gray’s life work into the ultimate companion guide to
his strategic thought. In the recent Winter issue of this journal, Lukas Milevski tipped
his hand at doing just that with “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray.”
He argues, “Gray’s conception of grand strategy emphasizes the agential context of
military strategy” and notes Gray’s view “contradicts the mainstream interpretation
particularly favored in the United States, in which grand strategy is identified as the
master of policy.”1 While Milevski argues these points with superb clarity, I write here
to highlight two critical areas of Gray’s thought Milevski omitted in his otherwise
comprehensive analysis.
The first, and perhaps more serious omission, concerns a matter of first principles.
Since grand strategy is synonymous with statecraft, this strategy must consider the
nature of the world order it plans to operate within. This consideration is where Gray
strayed from “mainstream” international relations thought. Current international
relations students have concentrated their study on the Waltz/Wendt debate of
international politics, which pits “neorealism” versus “constructivism.” Yet, Gray was
not a neorealist, and he disdained constructivism. Indeed, Gray referred to Waltz’s
Theory of International Politics as “a book which demonstrates that being elegantly
parsimonious in theory building offers insufficient compensation for being wrong.”2
He was perhaps the most vocal defender of classical realism, claiming that “flawed
though the principal texts of classical realism may be, when compared with more

1. Lukas Milevski, “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (Winter 2021–22):
81–94, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/8/.
2. Colin Gray, “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the Past—with GPS,” Review of International Studies 25,
no. 5 (December 1999): 161–82.
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contemporary would-be master/mistress-works, they have an overriding virtue.
To risk the vernacular, they got the big things right enough.”3
Given his embrace of classical realism, Gray had sweeping thoughts on the
international system:
As a neoclassical realist I insist that the game of polities (or security
communities) does not change from age to age, let alone from decade to
decade. I will stop just short of claiming that the game cannot change,
but only by way of a token nod in the direction of never saying never.
Paradoxically, perhaps, this stance is not a conservative one. It is alert
to the facts of cumulative, sometimes apparently non-linear, change
in the character of international relations, including international
strategic relations. It denies only the likelihood of change in the nature
of those relations.4

Given his embrace of realism and the classic realist works, Gray did not
support, for example, global governance as seen in his Another Bloody Century.
He also did not endorse global governance in his thoughts on grand strategy
(more on this below). This is not a small omission. Instead, it stems logically
from Gray’s understanding of world politics.
While Milevski synthesized Gray’s thoughts on grand strategy, his analysis
lacks the foundation upon which it rests. I contend one cannot understand Gray’s
conception of grand strategy by starting with his thoughts on strategy, as Milevski
does. Instead, this conception must begin with Gray’s fearless embrace and moving
reverence to the great works and scholars of classical realism highlighted so well in
the article, “Clausewitz Rules, OK?”5 Yet, Milevski skips this step entirely, which
leaves readers with a watered-down version of Gray’s thoughts on grand strategy.
Milevski’s second omission, as jarring as the first, is not mentioning Gray’s one
book on grand strategy, The Sheriff. In this short book, Gray outlines his thoughts
on what American grand strategy should look like as the “sheriff of the world
order.” He deals with the elusive concept of “world order,” noting it is “neither
self-enforcing nor is it comprehensively enforceable” and “every such ‘order’
requires a sheriff, or some other agent of discipline.” He also links this notion of
what American grand strategy should look like to his conception of international
politics, and he makes this point throughout the book (for example, see pages 37
and 55). Furthermore, Gray, from his realist perspective of world politics, sees
nongovernmental organizations and multinational organizations (like the UN)
as having no use in protecting the current world orders. Milevski also features
3. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules.”
4. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules.”
5. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules.”
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Gray’s essay, “Harry S. Truman and the Forming of American Grand Strategy in
the Cold War, 1945–1953,” in The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy,
and War that analyzes the grand strategy of Harry Truman. While the essay is
incredibly valuable to understanding Gray’s thoughts on grand strategy, it does not
carry the same weight as The Sheriff. 6
Perhaps Milevski did not mention The Sheriff since he wanted to only
discuss matters of theory. Yet, Gray was fond of quoting Bernard Brodie’s quip
that “strategic theory is a theory of action.”7 That Gray’s presentation of a grand
strategic “theory of action” is missing from Milevski’s essay beggars belief.

Phillip Dolitsky
Phillip Dolitsky is a master’s student at the School of International Service at
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6. Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2004).
7. Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy, no. 5 (Winter 1971): 151–61,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1147725.
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P

hillip Dolitsky identifies what he believes to be two significant omissions
in my exploration of Colin Gray’s grand strategic thought—
ignoring Gray’s classical realist perspective on international affairs and
neglecting The Sheriff as an example of how he would design a grand strategic theory
for action. Neither is substantive.
The classical realist perspective is essentially irrelevant; it is an international
relations identification, meaningless to the field of strategic studies. Academically and
practically, strategy is international relations-agnostic. Although many practitioners
might argue the two assumptions, that conflict and war are inevitable in principle—
distinct from saying particular wars are inevitable in practice—and that military
power remains relevant reflect a realist perspective, this is not the historical experience
of the field or real-world practice. Historically, representatives of all persuasions
(realists, liberals, fascists, Marxists, and many others) have thought about
strategy and, except for absolute pacifists, have also practiced strategy. The cute
paradigmatic/ideological distinctions of international relations collapse in the
real world of strategic practice. In this context, the degree to which Gray invoked
classical realism is at least as much to translate the fundamentals of his perspective
to nonstrategic studies, essentially an international relations audience, as it is a
statement of ideational identity.
Dolitsky, with unnecessary force, suggests it “beggars belief ” that I ignored
The Sheriff as an example of Gray’s grand strategic theory of action. Yet, The Sheriff
is not a book about grand strategy or statecraft. It engages topics related to defense
planning, strategy, and defense policy, tied together with a vision of American
engagement with the world (the titular sheriff ). American academics misguidedly
(and typically) consider grand vision to be grand strategy, but in actuality, none of
the four themes presented in The Sheriff, individually or together, comprise grand
strategy. The book does not engage with either nonmilitary issues or nonmilitary
power except in a token manner. It pertains to grand strategy only to the extent
that defense planning, strategy, defense policy, and visions of one’s role in the world
interact with statecraft. The Sheriff lacks the necessary breadth to be considered an
exploration of grand strategic or statecraft theory of action.
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Fundamentally, Gray did not write about statecraft or grand strategy as such;
he wrote about military strategy and defense, usually explicitly acknowledging
the grand strategic or statecraft context. Since he never substantially engaged
with nonmilitary power, Gray never wrote, nor could he write, a theory of
grand strategy or a grand strategic (let alone statecraft) theory for action.
This fact is not a slight against Gray. Virtually every scholar who has sought to
employ the concept of grand strategy has failed to engage with its full conceptual
and practical breadth, reflecting how hard it is to theorize grand strategy.
As a result, Gray did not compare the instrumental values of military and
nonmilitary power—except to identify a degree of fungibility. Although perhaps
relevant to statecraft as a concept, the paradigmatic debates of international
relations (which essentially concern the relative values of various forms of power)
hardly play a part in Gray’s grand strategic thought.
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